Smashing Peaches: Sherman's March to the Sea

William Tecumseh Sherman, born 8 February 1820, has been called the United States' first "modern general". He served under General Ulysses S. Grant in the west, most notably during the fall of Vicksburg, but when Grant was promoted by President Abraham Lincoln, Sherman took over his boss' old position in the west. In this position, Sherman engaged in total war, driving all the way to the Atlantic, burning as he went. He received some criticism for this brutal form of warfare, but he deemed it necessary to break the will of the South.

Sherman's march to the sea began with his belief in the "total war" concept – a concept frowned upon by most military leaders, both at the time and today. His reasoning behind this was that the Union army was not merely "fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war." (Ohio History Central, 2005) He intended to break the will of the rebel population, and thus, the will of the Confederate army, by any means necessary. Sherman proposed this plan after his and Grant's victory at Atlanta – an important railroad hub for the Confederacy, along with being one of their main industrial centers – and after the Union's supply lines were attacked in guerrilla warfare-style tactics by the rebels. "I can make this march, and make Georgia howl!" he vowed in a telegram to his superiors. Instead of sending his army on a wild goose chase after a phantasmal army, General Sherman received approval to split his army, sending 60,000 under the command of Major General George Thomas chasing the Confederate guerrillas to Tennessee, and taking the remaining 62,000 men through Georgia, going along, as he wrote, "smashing things to the sea." (Sherman's March, 1996)

This 'smashing' march was almost a blitzkrieg in its effectiveness, with many Confederate towns being attacked with little or no warning. (Weatherby, 2011) He sacked towns, burned plantations, and captured livestock and supplies, virtually unopposed by the army of General John Bell Hood, who had been on the run since Atlanta. Because of the incredibly fast pace of the march General Sherman left his supply trains days and even weeks behind, and thus he gave his troops leave to do virtually whatever they pleased for the duration of the march. Food and supplies were requisitioned from the civilian populace, and what couldn't be eaten or carried off was simply burned. Factories – such as they were – farms and railroads were all fair game to Sherman, as he considered them vital to the war effort, and rightly so. In fact, he went so far as to tear up almost 300 miles of railroad, had them heated in bonfires made from the railroad ties, and curled the rails around trees, making them essentially worthless. The locals called these "Sherman's Neckties," and still inspire sectional animosity to this day. (Wars and Battles, 2012) Telegraph wires, railroads, anything that could be used against his troops he had destroyed, demolished or mutilated beyond function. (Weatherby, 2011) It is also interesting to note that Hood's troops would burn stores of food as they went as well, to avoid Sherman from using them, but the Union army was moving at such a pace, that they couldn't burn them all without being overtaken.

Overall, it was a grueling venture, but the lack of restrictions made it worth it to many a Union footman, and the slaves freed under President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation swelled Sherman's ranks. But in December, after a total lightning war of sprinting across Georgia, Sherman finally made it to Savannah, the last stop before the Atlantic Ocean. Behind him, he and his army had cut a blazing swathe right through the heart of Georgia, leaving homesteads burnt, crops eaten or destroyed, and the people broken. As one Union soldier wrote, "it isn’t so sweet to secede, as [they] thought it would be." (Sherman's March, 1996) Sherman sent a communiqué to his counterpart, General Hood, demanding that the Confederate army in the city surrender; in return, Sherman promised to spare the soldiers, city and its inhabitants, and if not, he would utterly destroy them all. (Wars and Battles, 2012) Hood decided to abandon the city to Sherman, and on 21 December, Sherman marched in to Savannah and took it without firing a shot, declaring it a Christmas present to President Lincoln. They stayed in Savannah for the winter, and began their burning march again in the spring of 1865, and in spite of General Robert E. Lee replacing Hood with Johnston, Sherman's campaign into South Carolina was just as successful, leading to the surrender of Johnston's Confederate army, a few weeks after General Lee surrendered at Appomattox Courthouse.

William Tecumseh Sherman's 'March to the Sea' was brutal, ruthless, destructive and devastating, but it was extremely effective. It broke the will to fight in many Southerners, and cast doubts about the Confederacy's ability to survive in even the stoutest rebel's mind. “This Union and its Government must be sustained, at any and every cost,” explained one of Sherman’s subordinates. “To sustain it, we must war upon and destroy the organized rebel forces,--must cut off their supplies, destroy their communications…and produce among the people of Georgia a thorough conviction of the personal misery which attends war, and the utter helplessness and inability of their ‘rulers’ to protect them… If that terror and grief and even want shall help to paralyze their husbands and fathers who are fighting us… it is mercy in the end.” (Sherman's March, 1996) Sherman himself summed it up by saying "War is cruelty. You cannot refine it." No matter if you view him as a heartless, cruel war criminal as the South did, or a valorous hero willing to take the necessary steps to preserve the Union as he was viewed in the North, it is impossible to deny that the bold and extreme plan of this Ohioan helped speed along the end of the war, and prevent any more blood spilled in this one indivisible nation.

References

Ohio History Central. (2005). Ohio Historical Society. Retrieved from http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/entry.php?rec=551

Sherman's March. (1996) History.com. Retrieved from http://www.history.com/topics/shermans-march

Wars and Battles: March to the Sea. (2012, September 30). United states history. Retrieved from http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h111.html

Weatherby, Edwin. (2011, December 19). [Web log message]. Retrieved from http://pipenslippers.wordpress.com/2011/12/19/shermans-march-to-the-sea/

The Beginning of the End: The Battle of Gettysburg

"Generals can do anything. There's nothing so much like a god on earth as a General on a battlefield." -Col. Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, as played by Jeff Daniels in Gettysburg. This quote, while from a movie, is very apt for the battle of Gettysburg. The tactics – such as they were – are viewed in hindsight as sheer insanity, for the most part. Granted, they were rather hasty preparations, but still tactically unsound.

The battle at Gettysburg was entirely accidental. Rebel General Robert E. Lee had launched an offensive into Union-controlled territory after a series of successful campaigns. However, part of this planned offensive was to win over the populace and be resupplied by them. Unfortunately for Lee, the opposite occurred, where most towns were hostile to the Confederates. This left the rebels scavenging for supplies in the various towns, one of which was named Gettysburg. As some of the Confederates went into the town for supplies, especially shoes, they spied Union troops. Despite General Lee's order to avoid a general engagement until his entire army was concentrated, the rebels decided to mount a significant reconnaissance in force the following morning to determine the size and strength of the enemy force in his front.

Assuming the town to be undefended, Confederate Brigadier Generals James Archer and Joseph Davis marched to occupy the city under the command of General Henry Heth. Unbeknownst to Heth, the town was in fact defended, by Union Brigadier General John Buford's cavalry. (Williams, 2007) The Union troops were better equipped, and supported by horse-artillery, but the dismounted cavalry was outnumbered by the Confederate infantry, and after an hour of defense, were obliged to fall back to the hills outside the town. However, this gave two additional Union brigades, including the famed "Iron Brigade", to march and reinforce Buford's position on McPherson ridge. General John F. Reynolds, commander of I Corps, had an infinite amount of foresight at this point, immediately sending dispatches for nearest Union corps, the XI and III Corps, to begin moving to Gettysburg. However, Gen. Reynolds was shot and killed while positioning his troops, which thrust Gen. Abner Doubleday into the commander's position, in spite of his arrival only a short time earlier. The battle waged on, with both sides gaining reinforcements throughout the day, until about 2:30 PM, when General Lee arrived on the scene. His counterpart, General George Meade, was commanding the Union forces from approximately 9 miles away, in Taneytown, MD, but he too was making his way to the battlefield. Thus, the stage was set for one of the bloodiest battles in American history, and what many claim to be the turning point in the civil war.

One of the biggest problems with Lee's tactics for the rebels was overconfidence. After the victories they had accomplished, in spite of not winning the populace, they believed that they simply couldn't lose, due to their military prowess and the supposed righteousness of their cause. However, a bigger issue for them was a lack of intelligence. This was by no fault of Gen. Lee, but rather J.E.B. Stuart. His cavalry was supposed to gather intel on the Union army, but didn't return in a timely manner, forcing Lee to rely on a network of spies, whom he thought highly unreliable. (Anderson) Lee, after analyzing the forces he could see on the field, at first told Gen. Heth to call off the attack, but as what remained of his scout cavalry returned, advising Lee of more Confederate forces, Lee relented. Snap decisions of Lee's often won him the day, however, due to the lack of proper intel, Lee's decisions were vague at best, and this proved disastrous on the field. First, they forced the Federal army into a retreat – although the first of Meade's main army had arrived and began fortifying the hills – and Lee wanted to turn it from retreat to rout. After checking down the line, and allowing Heth's men to rest per the Heths' request, Lee planned to send another batch of men, telling his generals to take the hills "if practical". (Anderson) However, General James Longstreet arrived that evening, and advised to hold off the attack until the morning, and that proved a fatal mistake. Meade's men arrived in force over the night, fortified their hills, and were waiting for the rebels the next day. Lee continued his aggressive strategy, gambling that the only way to win was to forcefully attack. Gen. Longstreet vehemently opposed this, but led his men down the center, with the other Confederate units flanking on either side, and Lee sending his last fresh division as well: George Pickett's.

Meade, however, knew of Lee's aggressiveness, and didn't merely wait to be attacked. He ordered the troops who had retreated off Culp's Hill to go back up an retake the trenches they'd spent all night building, surprising the rebels. Needless to say, the Union troops were angry about being expelled from their foxholes, and were quite willing to get them back. In contrast to Lee, General Meade planned his tactics around his equipment and unit commanders: Sharps and Burnside single-shot carbines, Sharps rifles, and even a few Spencer repeating rifles among the cavalry. He planned for defense of the hills, and the occasional counter attack based on his unit commander's discretion, even though very few decided to counter, like Colonel Chamberlain. Unfortunately, Meade – like Lee – believed in a so-called 'gentleman's war', where the two sides would march in column files, firing at each other without cover and unleashing untold amounts of carnage. These tactics remained relative unchanged for years, until Generals Sherman and Grant thought to break away from the Old World's way of waging war. The cavalry at Gettysburg engaged in a classically stereotypical charge, but both sides had their cavalrymen fight dismounted for the better part of the war. ("Celebrate Gettysburg Magazine," 2011)

In short, this was Lee's greatest mistake of the Civil War. It led to his own undoing, and ultimately, the Confederacy's downfall. (Andrade, 2003) From his choice to attack without adequate intelligence or support from Stuart's cavalry, to his foolhardy advance known as Pickett's Charge, Lee's military brilliance was undermined by his aggressiveness. Meade, while not the military genius Lee was, was methodical and cautious, and in this rare situation, it paid off. His lack of aggressiveness, tempered with a willingness to counter, is what won him the day, and the battle, and eventually, the war. It also showed commanders on both sides that the traditional, age-old style of battles – the so-called 'gentleman's war' – was a thing of the past, and tactics needed to change with the weaponry and times, and lead us into the battlefields of today.

References

Andrade, Phil. (2003). Mistake of All Mistakes. Retrieved from http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/gettysburg/articles/mistakeofallmistakes.aspx

Anderson, Jack. (n.d.). Lee At Gettysburg: A Critical Analysis of Aggressive Tactics. Retrieved from http://wcoventry0.tripod.com/id23.htm

Celebrate Gettysburg Magazine. (2011, October 11). Retrieved from http://www.celebrategettysburg.com/civil-war-journal-5.html

Williams, Bryan. (2007, November 02). The Battle of Gettysburg. Retrieved from http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/gettysburg/getty11.aspx

Popular Destiny: Causes and Views Leading to the Civil War

Manifest destiny and popular sovereignty are not common phrases evoked in modern culture. What exactly are these two theories, popularized so long ago? What roles did they play in changes to the culture and society of the day? Were they really as divisive as is frequently asserted? These questions and more will be explored in the contents of this paper, examining the root causes of the United States' Civil War.

First up, "manifest destiny". Manifest Destiny is the theory propagated by the religious fervor in the late 1700's, primarily from New England's Puritans. The victories of the War of 1812 fueled this religious nationalism, as did the Louisiana Purchase, and Lewis & Clark's exploration of the territory. However, it wasn't until newspaper columnist and editor John O'Sullivan's article regarding the annexation of Texas published in The United States Magazine and Democratic Review was the term 'Manifest Destiny' actually coined. (ushistory.org, 2008) As vast droves of people moved west, first with the promise of free land, and then with the Californian gold rush, they brought the economics of their home states along with them, leading to Southerners looking for land to produce cotton, tobacco and other crops to clash with the industrialized Northerners looking for factory lands and resources to tap into. These issues were temporarily resolved with some measures like the Mason-Dixon Line, but Manifest Destiny raised questions about this fledgling nation's views on religion, regional economics – and their relation to each other on a federal level, race and the value of man, national patriotism, and even morality, to an extent. 

Popular sovereignty, on the other hand, was the name given the theory that the people living in a given area should decide their own nature of government. The first man to really propagate the theory was Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan, however, it didn't gain national prominence until Stephen A. Douglas coined the term in 1854. There were two main factions of the popular sovereignty movement: one that asserted that the territory's settlers should vote on their status early in territorial development. The other stance said a territory's status should be determined by a vote, taken when the territory was ready for statehood. ("United states history," 2009) This theory was the basis for the Compromise of 1850, and then the Kansas-Nebraska Act four years later. However, due to the "Bleeding Kansas' tragedy, the gaping holes in this ideology became sharply evident. After these events, it was mocking called "squatter sovereignty" by John C. Calhoun, and consequently picked up by the theories critics, primarily Southerners and pro-slavery Northerners. It was hoped that the application of popular sovereignty to incoming states and would preserve the Union. Unfortunately, it was not to be, as it would only work if there were enough voters in the territory persuaded to lean pro-slavery, and apart from an ACORN-level of voter fraud, was nigh impossible to achieve. The death knell for popular sovereignty came in the 1858 Lincoln-Douglas senatorial debates, when Stephen A. Douglas admitted that he believed that local laws could nullify the current federal fugitive-slave laws. That is when most historians see the theory as losing most of its Southern backing, and talks of secession began in earnest. (Weatherby, 2011)

These two views both had their own respective heydays. Manifest destiny inspired a nation to grow to its maximum physical potential, and even made a resurgence with the admission of Alaska and Hawaii. It united a people and gave them a purpose: to be fruitful and multiply across the land, and spread American influence from sea to shining sea. On the other hand, popular sovereignty, a theory born, raised and propagated from the south, tried to appease both sides of the slavery debate. However, all it truly succeeded in doing was driving the two sides further apart, even to the point of bloodshed. Effective for a time, it was at most a temporary measure, not really resolving anything for our nation. By the time it was given up, our newly-expanded country was not only divided ideologically, but was on the brink of war, needing only the slightest catalyst to push it over the edge into a bloody oblivion.

References

ushistory.org. (2008, April 12). U.S. history online textbook. Retrieved from http://www.ushistory.org/us/29.asp

United states history. (2009, May 14). Retrieved from http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h228.html

Weatherby, E. (2011, December 19). [Web log message]. Retrieved from http://pipenslippers.wordpress.com/2011/12/19/civil-war-sectionalism/

Hancock the Superb

Winfield Scott Hancock was one of the most overlooked Union generals in the entire Civil War, and history doomed him to share part of his name with one of the most despised generals of the time. Hancock, a Major General with experience from the Mexican-American War, was known as “Hancock the Superb”, and more informally by his troops as “The Thunderbolt of the Potomac”.  (Eicher, 2001)  But why is Hancock so forgotten? And what did he do to earn such fantastic nicknames? This writer will answer these questions and more in this glimpse into the life and military career of Hancock the Superb.

Winfield Scott Hancock was born on Valentine’s Day, 1824, an identical twin, in fact, and was named for General Winfield Scott, hero of the War of 1812. That namesake would come back to haunt him in his military career, which he didn’t even plan on having throughout his childhood. But he was accepted to West Point, and graduated as a second lieutenant in the infantry, just in time for the Mexican-American War. He earned a brevet, and then was transferred to the Army’s Quartermaster Depart, where he served as the Assistant Quartermaster until the outbreak of the Civil War.

Hancock was stationed in California at the start of the Civil War, his biggest struggle was preventing Union munitions stockpiled in Los Angeles from falling into Southern supporters’ hands. He was then reassigned to be quartermaster in Kentucky, but General George McClellan requisitioned him and put a star on his shoulder to command troops in William “Baldy” Smith’s divisions. Hancock’s first real test came in May 1862, at the battle of Williamsburg. He took his brigade and occupied two abandoned outposts, securing the Union’s flank. In spite of the Union losing the battle, Hancock’s reputation grew enormously, and McClellan saw great potential in Hancock. In fact, after the battle, McClellan wrote to his wife, “Hancock was superb today,” in addition to complementing Hancock on his physical appearance – as Hancock was a very attractive man with a commanding demeanor. (Jordan, 1988) After this, “the Superb” became Hancock’s nickname for the rest of the war.

Later, in the September battle at Antietam, Hancock was given command of a second division, taking over for the mortally-wounded General Israel Richardson. The next spring, the newly-promoted Hancock took command of another unit for an outgoing general and began working with General “Fighting Joe” Hooker. Major General Hancock was replaced for the Battle of Gettysburg, but when his new commander learned one of his other generals was killed, Hancock took command of the 1^st, 3^rd and 11^th Corps for the duration of the battle. This was an unheard-of honor, since there was a senior general on the field that day. However, Winfield even managed to find the time to correct tactical mistakes at Peach Orchard, and stave off the Rebels’ “Pickett’s Charge.” He was wounded during the charge, spending about nine months in pain and recovery – and still recruiting for the Union Army – after his doctors finally removed the mini ball. It’s interesting to note that in spite of his crucial role in Gettysburg, when Congress passed a joint resolution thanking the generals that played a key role in the battle, Hancock’s name was omitted. Some speculate this was because he shared his name with a failed general from the outset of the war.

After his recovery and return to his beloved Second Corps, his troops had been reassigned under General Ulysses S. Grant, who changed the Army’s fighting style to something much more akin to Hancock’s own. For example, in spite of the Union’s loss at the Battle of the Wilderness in May 1864, they didn’t retreat; in fact, Hancock led his 2^nd Corps in a counteroffensive against A.P. Hill’s troops, driving the Confederates back in panic and disorder. If it weren’t for General James Longstreet’s forces arriving to reinforce the Rebs, Hancock would’ve forced the collapse of the entire Confederate right flank. (Tucker, 1980) Just days later, the Superb led his men to capture over 2,800 prisoners at Spotsylvania Courthouse. However, at the battle at Petersburg, he deferred command to the current commander on the field, whom he outranked, due to his lack of knowledge about the battle situation and landscape. Unfortunately, the field commander opted not to order a final charge, something Winfield surely would have done, and that final assault would have in all likelihood ended the war 10 months early.

After his Gettysburg wound reopened and left him, for all intensive purposes, immobilized, and his troops faced several humiliating defeats without him, he was recalled to Washington D.C. His last battle was in October 1864, at Burgess Mill, where the Second Corps performed soundly under Hancock, by capturing and subsequently losing the strategic Boydton Plank Road. After the surrender of Lee and the fall of the Confederacy, Hancock was at odds with Grant, as Hancock believed in more lenient treatment of the South. Notwithstanding that, he was assigned as Commander of the Fifth Military District during the Reconstruction; he also received copious criticism in that post as well. He issued “General Orders No. 40”, which said in effect that if there was a state of peace in his district, he wouldn’t interfere with civil matters, nor would he post soldiers at polling places. He even went so far in his fair treatment of the South, that when Abraham Lincoln was assassinated, he was vocally opposed to the execution of Mary Surratt, one of the co-conspirators, much to the indignation of Northerners.

When Ulysses Grant became President, Winfield became head of the Department of the Dakotas, until 1872 when George Meade died, and Hancock assumed his role as Commander of the Division of the Atlantic, or Department of the East. Then, in 1880, Hancock was the Democratic presidential candidate, and the war hero was very narrowly defeated by James A. Garfield. Six years later, on February 9^th, Winfield Scott Hancock the Superb died, from complications brought about by his diabetes. He was 62 years old, and was laid to rest in Montgomery Cemetery, Norristown, PA.

References

Eicher, John H., and David J. Eicher. (2001). Civil War High Commands. pp. 277–78.

Jordan, David M. (1988). Winfield Scott Hancock:  A Soldier’s Life.  Indiana University Press, Bloomington. Retrieved 2 March from http://www.civilwar.org/education/history/biographies/winfield-scott-hancock.html

Sifakis, Stewart. (2003). Who Was Who In The Civil War? Retrieved March 1, 2012, from http://www.civilwarhome.com/hanbio.htm

Tucker, Glenn. (1980). Hancock the Superb.  Morningside Books, Dayton, OH. Retrieved 2 March 2012 from http://www.civilwar.org/education/history/biographies/winfield-scott-hancock.html

A House Divided

The Civil War was not as cut-and-dry as many people would assume. The complexities of the political and social climate surrounding it are copious, and this writer will do his best to give you a brief glimpse of them in this paper, as well as a breakdown of the Battle of Gettysburg and its long-term effects.

Most Americans today think that the Civil War was about slavery from the beginning. While slavery did have a role, it was not the main factor. It was simply another item on the list of grievances the southern states had against the federal government, which they believed held too much power over the states. From the outset of the south’s succession into the Confederate States of America, everything should have gone in the Union’s favor: 23 states boasted over 21 million people, to the South’s 11 states and 9 million people, of whom 3.5 million were slaves. (ushistory.org, 2011) It is interesting to note that in spite of the population difference, the Confederacy’s army was roughly the same size as the Union’s for the early years of the war. The Union also had had a stronger industrial base, complete control of the seas (and therefore, the import of gunpowder), was home to America’s top military academy, and had a stronger transportation network and central government. By all rights, the Union looked far better on paper.

However, the Confederacy had its advantages as well: as an agrarian society, it had no trouble producing the food it needed, although transporting it to the front lines proved to be a problem later on. It also had a plethora of fantastic military officers: Robert E. Lee, Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson and J.E.B. Stewart are just a few examples of the South’s exemplary military leaders. The Union may have had West Point, but the other 7 military academies were located within Confederate borders. But leaders are only as good as their followers, and the troops are only as good as their equipment, and that was something that they were sorely outclassed on. Nevertheless, the southerners’ ingenuity meant that they had built several gunpowder mills and melted down church and plantation bells in their foundries for much-needed iron.

All of this meant the war was more or less a stalemate, even tipping in the Confederacy’s favor at times, until the Battle of Gettysburg. What began as an unplanned skirmish between Union scouts and Confederates looking for shoes, the Battle of Gettysburg soon grew to an unprecedented bloodbath, with involving 160,000 Americans, and leaving over 51,000 killed, wounded, missing or captured in just 3 days. This slaughter was the turning point in the war, as Lee’s battered army had take unsustainable losses and never drove into the North again. This was in part due to the need to stretch their army on the northern and western fronts; in fact, Lee lost more men at Gettysburg than Confederate Generals Braxton and Bragg had in their entire Army of Tennessee. (Chambers, et al. 1999) Because Lee was unable to replenish his numbers, he was forced to play defense, and the Union generals simply tightened the noose around the Confederacy, until there was nowhere left to run from Appomattox.

The Civil War had many different affects on the United States. It is important to note that it merely preserved the Union of states, but not national unity in and of itself. Probably the most prevalent affect, at least in the modern mind, is the downfall of slavery in the U.S., which spawned the 13^th, 14^th and 15^th Amendments to the Constitution. However, that was one that didn’t even come into play until the last half of the war. It also made us as a nation choose between systems of free labor versus bonded labor, which was the economic side of the abolition of slavery. Militarily, it marked the advent of “total warfare”, a military doctrine that targeted not only one’s warfighters and war-making facilities, but the general populous. This wasn’t classified as a ‘doctrine’ until World War I, but General William T. Sherman used it very effectively, and unknowingly opened the door to what is known today as “psychological warfare”. It also proved that sheer firepower does not always determine the outcome of a battle. The previously so-called “dishonorable” tactics of entrenching and fortifying your position revolutionized warfare, with all its pomp and sheer insanity. It also debuted the conical bullet, rifled barrels, shell casings containing the gunpowder and bullet pre-assembled, and repeating rifles, which advanced war tactics, but sadly added to the slaughter of the time.

All in all, the Civil War is an ugly blot in our past. It could have been avoided, and should have been, but if the end justifies the means, I still don’t think it was worth it. With more Americans killed in one war than in all the rest combined, we learned a hard, bloody lesson, and one that, God willing, we will never have to be refreshed in.

References

Chambers, John Whiteclay II & G. Kurt Piehler. (1999). Major Problems in American Military History.  pg. 176.

ushistory.org (2011) A House Divided: Strengths and Weaknesses: North vs. South. U.S. History Online Textbook. Retrieved October 9, 2011, from http://www.ushistory.org/us/33b.asp