The Aftermath in Antebellum America

The American Civil War the bloodiest, most devastating conflict ever witnessed in the history of this young nation, with casualties surpassing one million overall, exceeding all other wars combined that Americans had been involved in, up to Vietnam. This war brought about base alterations to the way of life, and the very thinking of a nation, permanently changing the economic, political, and social structures thought to be secure at that time. Some of the changes were good, others not as much, but we as Americans are still feeling the impact from the Civil War to this very day, decades after the last surviving veteran of that awful, bloody clash passed away.

If you were to ask most people today what the biggest, lasting impact the Civil War had on America, they would most likely reply with something about freedom for the slaves. However, this is not the case, as this writer will explain later in the paper. Slavery was abolished due to the Civil War, yes, but it really was a minor player until the latter half of the conflict. Even without slavery being in effect, the amount of racism prevalent in the South after the war was as bad – if not worse – than before, since many of the plantation owners sought to reassert their control over the region, keeping the freed blacks on the bottom rung of the social ladder. Slavery had been such a pivotal part of the South's economy, that trying to cope without it was a struggle for many, so they fell into slightly modified versions of their old habits. This was only partially successful for them, as the very social system of the South was undermined by the Emancipation Proclamation and Reconstruction, and the social institutions that had long ruled the South were no longer pertinent. ("Race and segregation,") Eventually, the radical white supremacists would come to power in the South, leading to a civil rights battle that continued on to the 1960's, and to an extent, this very day.

An even bigger change brought about by the Civil War was that of economic control given to the Federal government. The National Bank Acts of 1863, '64 and '65 created a uniform currency, and forced any state-run banks to join the national system, something that former President Andrew Jackson had fought so hard against. These acts would eventually lay the groundwork for the private bank known today as the Federal Reserve System, or the Fed. The government, now with newfound control over the economics of the nation, began to pour money into businesses they thought fit, and to industrialize both the North and the antebellum South. A "Second Industrial Revolution" was sparked, with the Federal government rerouting money into public transportation – especially railroads – and also into communication, to allow for both easier and swifter transportation and contact with the Southern overseers. In addition, the government also strong-armed their choices for manufacturing and other businesses into power, mainly by tariffs, favorable loans and various subsidies. However, this did unify the recovering nation's economy, bringing the capitalist's market system into the South, finally doing away with their agrarian, semi-sustenance economy. The gears of industry had finally found their way into the South, and with the support of large, established economic enterprises, were there to stay.

 This industrialization of the South was primarily put into effect by President Abraham Lincoln, under his 10% Plan, but upon his assassination by John Wilkes Booth, Vice President Andrew Johnson – a Democrat from Tennessee – took over the Reconstruction process. Johnson seemed to take up the mantle of his predecessor well, but then seemed to give in to the radical Northerners by publicly attacking planter aristocracy of the South, and maintaining that those who participated in the rebellion should be punished. He decided not to enforce Lincoln's plan, instead implementing much harsher terms, disenfranchising all former military and civil officers of the Confederacy – not just the major players, as Lincoln's plan had – and anyone who owned Southern property worth $20,000 or more. To add seeming insult to injury, President Johnson made all of their estates liable to confiscation. (Weatherby, 2011) He justified this by saying it was to force a necessary shift in political and social power, from the old plantation aristocracy to smaller, localized artisans and farmers, and it would cause an essential alteration in Southern society.

So, with Congress adjourning from April to December 1865, Johnson implemented his plan using the interim governors he appointed. The Southern states were all required to hold conventions that either repealed or voided their declarations of secession, acknowledged the abolishment of slavery, and – with the exception of South Carolina – renounced all Confederate debts. The newly elected legislators from these states, excluding Mississippi, then ratified the Thirteenth Amendment, assuring freedom for all freed blacks. By the end of that year, every former Confederate state except Texas had reestablished a fully-functioning, autonomous civil government.

In short, the South would be a much different place, even today, if Booth hadn't assassinated Lincoln. The term "Reconstruction" implies that it was merely fixed, just put back together the way it was before. That, quite frankly, is not the case. The South was broken completely to its core, and was rebuilt from the ground up, forever changing a Southerner's way of life, even to this very day. Was it Lincoln's, or even Johnson's intention to fundamentally shift the groundwork upon which an entire region was constructed? Was it their wish to see a people have to completely start over with their way of living? This writer would assert both yes, and no. It was their intention to break the South's dependency upon slaves, and to begin the industrialization of the region; however, it was never their intention to crush the people in a way to make them resentful. Even to this very day, the flag of the Confederacy may be seen flying in various locations in the South, and an intense irritation when certain memoirs of the Civil War are displayed or played, proof of a deep-seated anger and resentment for what they consider to be a mishandling of the Reconstruction after the War. But it was merely the product of fallible men, doing what they believed was best for their country.

References

Discuss the Political, Social, and Economic Impact of the Civil War on the US. (2010, 12). StudyMode.com. Retrieved from http://www.studymode.com/essays/Discuss-The-Political-Social-And-Economic-521346.html

Race and Segregation in Post Civil War America. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://instruct.westvalley.edu/kelly/Distance_Learning/History_17B/Lecture02/Lecture02_p01.htm

Weatherby, E. (2011, December 19). [Web log message]. Retrieved from http://pipenslippers.wordpress.com/2011/12/19/social-and-economic-reconstruction/

The Ten Percent

The "10% Reconstruction Plan" was introduced by Abraham Lincoln in December 1863. It was essentially a pattern to restore the Rebel states back into the Union, once the fighting had ceased and the Union declared victory. Under this plan, Lincoln laid out how the South would be rebuilt, physically, economically and socially, and then eventually bring back the rebellious states back into the fold of the Union. Unfortunately, this plan would never get the chance to be put into effect, since Lincoln's assassination by John Wilkes Booth thrust Andrew Johnson into power, and gave Johnson the ability to implement his own plan.

President Lincoln's design to rehabilitate the South began with the decree that would give it the nickname "10% plan": if 10% of the population of a Rebel state – according to the 1860 voter roll – would take an oath of allegiance and pledge to abide by the Emancipation Proclamation and 14^th Amendment, they would be repatriated into the Union. (Mintz) That 10% would then be allowed to elect delegates to craft new state constitutions and governments, provided they recognized the abolition of slavery, and anyone save Confederate government officials and high-ranking military officers would be eligible for a full pardon from the President. One of the most attractive – to the Southerners – yet controversial – to Congress – moves by Lincoln was to guarantee that all of the South's citizens would have their private property protected, with the exception of slaves. (Foner) Most of the more moderate Republican in the Senate and House of Representatives supported this whole-heartedly, since they wanted to just end the conflict, much to the chagrin of the more hardened partisans, who wanted to punish the South with an iron hand.

It was primarily a political move, and in Lincoln's eyes, it would bring about a faster end to the war, by encouraging the populace of the South to abandon the rebel cause, and strengthening the North's resolve by giving them the proverbial light at the end of the tunnel. However, Congress wanted citizens to take an oath of loyalty before being repatriated, and said that not just 10%, but 50% of the voters should be required to take this oath before being allowed statehood again. This clash of ideas begged the question: who should make the policies for the Reconstruction? Congress, or the President? The Democrats in the Congressional houses, who were clamoring the loudest for a truce and peaceful solution, were initially unopposed to Lincoln's plan, but then claimed that the Legislative Branch should be the ones to create the terms of Reconstruction. Hardline Republicans agreed with this, but only because they felt the terms needed to be stricter, to punish the South for seceding. They feared the rise of the plantation aristocracy once again, and that blacks would be forced back into slavery or virtual slavery, by being kept on the bottom rung of the social ladder. Because of this, in spite of Tennessee, Louisiana and Arkansas electing officials and ratifying constitutions that met all of Lincoln's requirements, Congress rejected them, even though the received presidential approval. Those self same hardline, radical Republicans presented the Wade-Davis Bill as an alternative to the 10% Plan, and it was strong armed through both houses of the legislature. They had hoped to wrest control of the restoration process, and fundamentally transform the society of the South, disbanding the established plantation aristocracy, redistribute the land, develop industry, and guarantee civil liberties – though not a vote – for former slaves, and in spite of being a minority in the Republican party, managed to sway enough of their fellow GOP members to pass the Wade-Davis Bill. This bill incorporated the 50% requirement thought necessary, and the so-called "ironclad oath" swearing allegiance to the Union of the United States. But thanks to the system of checks and balances integrated into the framework of our nation, Lincoln pocket-vetoed the bill, letting it simply expire on his desk. It is interesting to note that if Congress had waited until after the election to pass the bill, Lincoln might have possibly considered it. As it stood, however, he would've appeared as a uncompromising, partisan radical who wasn't interested in ending the war quickly.  (Phillips)

The 10% plan had begun to be implemented under Lincoln, with certain aspects of it being run by the military, and some from the civilian sector, as Lincoln authorized several of his wartime generals to resettle former slaves on confiscated lands. For example, General William T. Sherman’s Special Field Order No. 15 set aside land in South Carolina and islands off the coast of Georgia for roughly 40,000 former slaves. To counter this, and in retaliation for the veto of the Wade-Davis Bill, Congress established the Freedmen's Bureau, and it was only slightly more successful than the failed bill. Many in the South regarded it as little more than a nuisance, and most considered it a threat to the very way of life in the recovering states. The southern aristocracy saw the bureau as a northern attempt to redistribute their lands to former slaves and resisted the Freedmen’s Bureau from its beginning, and more than a few plantation owners intimidated the former slaves into giving up their land, while others bribed the Bureau officials, who would then turn a blind eye to the abuse of the freed blacks. Despite the debauchery to be found in the department, the Freedmen's Bureau did manage to establish schools for the blacks, giving nearly 250,000 freed slaves access to education.

Unfortunately, the crazed, deranged schemes of John Wilkes Booth never gave the country a chance to see Lincoln's 10% Plan to be fully implemented, even though Lincoln and Congress were heading to a political showdown. After Lincoln's death the day after he was shot, it vaulted Vice President Andrew Johnson – a Tennessee Democrat who didn't care for Lincoln's plan at all – into power.

References

Foner, Eric. Forever Free: The Story of Emancipation & Reconstruction. New York: Vintage Books, 2005.

Mintz, R. (n.d.). Oracle thinkquest. Retrieved from http://library.thinkquest.org/J0112391/reconstruction.htm

Phillips, B. (n.d.). Spark notes. Retrieved from http://www.sparknotes.com/history/american/reconstruction/section1.rhtml

Ethics of a Historian

When people think of ethical problems in certain fields, usually history isn't a primary topic. Professions like nursing or business have the highest profile ethical debates, but history doesn't get the prevalence it should. History makes people who they are, and holds key insights as to where they're headed. But history can easily be twisted, and recorded differently than remembered, and used to further an agenda, merely because one historian was willing to violate his ethics to promote his bias.

Many claim that historians, like scientists or journalists, are unbiased. This is not the case, however, because in both fields, men lean one direction or another based on their worldviews. Worldviews filter the vision of each individual, much like sunglasses filter the sun. Facts, data, opinions and any other information are viewed and interpreted based off the ways in which your point of view has been shaped, by the era and culture in which you were born and raised, by your education, and by the expectations of the communities to which you belong, both by choice and by birth. This poses an ethical problem, however: if historians are supposed to be objective, how can we do that when our starting point is tainted by our worldviews? How can two historians who unearth the same data or historical evidence – whether it be an artifact or manuscript or what have you – and come up with two vastly different results? The answer is simple: bias stemming from your worldview. As much as any historian, scientist, journalist or any other supposedly unbiased professional would hate to admit it, everyone has their biases. An example that has been used with prevalence in some historical circles is that of a pair of archaeologists, unearthing the fossilized remains of a dinosaur of some kind. One man states with absolute certainty that it died millions of years ago, somehow being protected from scavengers while slowly buried by river sediment. Another man, an archaeologist with the same level of education, but a different background, would look at the exact same remains, yet claim that they were buried rapidly, with some aquatic, cataclysmic event – such as a worldwide flood – and that the vast amounts of sediment displaced sealed away the specimen for a few thousand years, until being unearthed today. Sadly, the worst part about this example is that, with a rare exception, both archaeologists would deny they were being biased, yet would accuse the other of the very thing. If both men could stand up and be willing to acknowledge their prejudices, civil discourse, and an increase in knowledge, would ensue.

Acknowledging one's biases and preconceived notions is the first step in overcoming them, as painful or seemingly unprofessional this may be. Admitting bias also means admitting biases in your sources as well. Just as the historian has bias, those who came before and recorded history had biases as well. The historian Josephus would record an event in one manner, being a Jew, while Philo Judaeus would record the same event completely differently, being a secular contemporary. If you understand that everyone has bias, and you declare that, then all your work can be taken as it should – with the proverbial grain of salt.

If you don't admit your bias, though, you will begin to sacrifice other ethical considerations on the altar of partisanship: ignoring contrary evidence, theories and views, for one. By shouting down the opposition, overlooking a bit of evidence that doesn't quite line up with your theory or just submitting to the established order of things because it's the "proper" thing to do, you lose credibility, and your argument will lack a foundation. As iron sharpens iron, a challenging view or opposing theory will strengthen your own, in a make or break situation.

Any number of philosophical theories could be translated to suit a comeback for these dilemmas, whether it be a utilitarianist view, a relativist view, or even normative and virtue ethics; for the sake of the argument, however, deontology will be chosen, since it seems to be most applicable in this situation. Since deontology stresses the importance of duty to the 'rules' above all else, it's extremely apt for a historian in his, or her, field. Deontology at its core means that we are duty-bound, and in order for a historian to do his or her best work, they must adhere to the duties placed upon them, namely, objectivity and honesty. This field, like any science, is no place for consequentialism, because historians are to act morally right, not based on the consequences or their own personal virtues, but because it is required of them. Honesty is expected, regardless of the outcome. It doesn't matter if the end result just falls in line with every other historical thesis, or if it sets the world of historians on its proverbial head, so long as it is reached through honest means, accepting all evidence, and giving full merit to all opposing theories. By accepting his or her own bias, and being willing to place duty over that bias, the modern historian can begin to break away from the establishment and their status quo, and promote free thought among all branches of history: from the Indiana Jones-esque archaeologist to the lowliest lab tech, to the student getting his proverbial foot in the door.

History is, unfortunately, a rather overlooked branch of study in modern culture. There isn't vast amounts of wealth to be made, not a permanent celebrity status if you become successful, or even a reasonable standard of becoming successful. But it is a unique area of study, because to have a part in it, you must truly love it. And if you do truly love it, doing your duty to keep it intellectually sound, and morally straight, won't be a cumbersome, inconvenient bother, but something that you strive to accomplish every waking hour. It is a historian's duty, yes, but it is also a historian's passion. And that is why all historians need to keep each other accountable, sharpening and testing one another, and ever increasing their thirst for knowledge and unlocking the secrets of mankind's past.

Utilitarianism: A Union of Hedonism and Christianity

Utilitarianism is considered by many to be one of the most persuasive and influential theories ever presented in philosophical circles. Even though it wasn't completely expressed in its modern sense until the 19^th century, unlabeled utilitarianism has been seen all throughout history. Because of this, there's no real set, uniform type of utilitarianism, but most people who claim to be utilitarianist hold the view that the morally right action is the action that produces the most good. Some would claim this is merely a subset of consequentialism, since in essence, what is considered the right action is based entirely on the consequences produced. Others claim it's a branch of egoism, but utilitarianism has a grander scope of the consequences considered: utilitarianists seek to maximize the overall good, considering the good of others as well as one's own good. Both Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, the classical utilitarianists, agreed with Epicurus' hedonistic view of value, that the worth of something is measured by how much good is brought about for the greatest number. (Burns, 2005) This works for the utilitarianist, because the theory is impartial and gender-neutral, meaning that everyone's happiness is equal, whether you're a homeless man, a single mom, a sports star or the president.

The origins of utilitarianism are a bit disputed, even though Jeremy Bentham was the first to really pin down and develop actual "utilitarianism", because the concept of the greatest good for the greatest number had been around for ages before. The distinctive part about Bentham's utilitarianism is the premise that morally proper actions and behaviors will not bring harm to others, but rather increase the happiness and utility of the people involved. It is interesting to note that many of the earliest utilitarians were in fact theologians. Richard Cumberland, John Gay and others believed that it was our duty to promote human happiness, since it was God's will that we be happy. Gay specifically held that wants what's best for us, He wants us to be happy, and since God gave us a measure of virtue, the happiness of mankind is that measure, but "once removed." (Driver, 2009) Combined with the view of human motivation and even some egotistic elements, Gay concluded that a person's salvation and eternal happiness depended solely on compliance with the will of God, as did virtue itself. So as one promoted the happiness of mankind, it overlapped with the happiness of one's self, and it wasn't merely an accident, but divine providence. This view, while acceptable at the time, isn't a very clean theory, because it isn't clear or scientifically measurable what work God does, at least in regards of normative ethics.

Gay's theory, however, has considerable influence on later utilitarianistic writers. William Paley took Gay's theories on utilitarianism and continued to develop them, but men like David Hume rejected the theological views in favor more naturalistic approach, relying primarily on human nature's sympathetic interaction with others. Hume's absence of God as a theoretical necessity undermined both Paley's and Gay's work, but all three were considered to be highly influential to utilitarianism in general. There were other notable utilitarians during that time period, specifically Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson, and these men, along with the aforementioned three, make what some call the "British Moralists", and were all key influences on classic utilitarianism. (Driver, 2009)

Utilitarianism in and of itself is an interesting theory. It's views on the collective good are loved and hated at the same time, being both wonderful and horrid. Jeremy Bentham thought that if man could be taught to care for the collective, everyone would be better off. If humans could unconditionally love one another without reserve, and put the good of the group before their own – while it still included their own good, for the most part – then a utopian society would result, because the happiness of the community as a whole is nothing other than the addition of all the individual humans' interests. (Kemerling, 2011)

This very premise posed a problem, though. It didn't factor for the inevitable evil that is so pervasive in human beings, known amongst Christian circles as the "sin nature". In fact, Dr. Leonard Peikoff states in his book The Ominous Parallels,

"Utilitarianism is a union of hedonism and Christianity. The first teaches man to love pleasure; the second, to love his neighbor. The union consists in teaching man to love his neighbor’s pleasure. To be exact, the Utilitarians teach that an action is moral if its result is to maximize pleasure among men in general."

So according to utilitarianists, man should serve, but not serve a specific nation or even economic class, but merely for the so-called "greatest good," regardless of who it may or may not harm. Dr. Peikoff goes on to point out that Mill, one of the aforementioned fathers of the utilitarian theory, says that men must be "disinterested" and "strictly impartial" about their own happiness and well-being, in spite of what is natural inclinations may be. (Peikoff, 1983) Because of this blind following for the collective, the theory can easily be hijacked for the malevolent use of a select few, using propaganda and philosophy. This can be seen in the writings of Karl Marx; Lenin's October Revolution, where workers banded together claiming the good of many at the expense of the few; the Nazi regime of Hitler, with Dr. Josef Goebbels telling his countrymen that they needed to put the good of the Fatherland before their own, regardless of consequence; and then perfected again in Russia, under the leadership of Josef Stalin, and ultimately leading to the deaths of millions of Soviet citizens. In a disturbing twist, Dr. Peikoff also finds these very principles being taught with prevalence in the American school system, from colleges, all the way to grade school.

It's hard to say if Bentham, Mill, Hume, and the other fathers of Utilitarianism would be proud of what their theory had accomplished, if they would overlook the atrocities it is linked to of the 20^th century, if they would have any regrets, or attempt to alter their theory. But for a theory designed to bring the greatest pleasure to the greatest number of people, it has brought a great deal of pain into the world. A theory much like Communism, socialism or fascism, utilitarianism is a wonderful idea – on paper. But unfortunately, when applied in a practical sense, is nothing more than that: a tried, and failed, idea.

References

Burns, J. H. (2005). Happiness and Utility:Jeremy Bentham’s Equation. Retrieved from http://www.utilitarianism.com/jeremy-bentham/greatest-happiness.pdf

Driver, J. (2009). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/

Kemerling, G. K. (2011, November 12). www.philosophypages.com. Retrieved from http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/5q.htm

Peikoff, L. (1983). The Ominous Parallels: the End of Freedom in America. New York City: Plume.

Smashing Peaches: Sherman's March to the Sea

William Tecumseh Sherman, born 8 February 1820, has been called the United States' first "modern general". He served under General Ulysses S. Grant in the west, most notably during the fall of Vicksburg, but when Grant was promoted by President Abraham Lincoln, Sherman took over his boss' old position in the west. In this position, Sherman engaged in total war, driving all the way to the Atlantic, burning as he went. He received some criticism for this brutal form of warfare, but he deemed it necessary to break the will of the South.

Sherman's march to the sea began with his belief in the "total war" concept – a concept frowned upon by most military leaders, both at the time and today. His reasoning behind this was that the Union army was not merely "fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war." (Ohio History Central, 2005) He intended to break the will of the rebel population, and thus, the will of the Confederate army, by any means necessary. Sherman proposed this plan after his and Grant's victory at Atlanta – an important railroad hub for the Confederacy, along with being one of their main industrial centers – and after the Union's supply lines were attacked in guerrilla warfare-style tactics by the rebels. "I can make this march, and make Georgia howl!" he vowed in a telegram to his superiors. Instead of sending his army on a wild goose chase after a phantasmal army, General Sherman received approval to split his army, sending 60,000 under the command of Major General George Thomas chasing the Confederate guerrillas to Tennessee, and taking the remaining 62,000 men through Georgia, going along, as he wrote, "smashing things to the sea." (Sherman's March, 1996)

This 'smashing' march was almost a blitzkrieg in its effectiveness, with many Confederate towns being attacked with little or no warning. (Weatherby, 2011) He sacked towns, burned plantations, and captured livestock and supplies, virtually unopposed by the army of General John Bell Hood, who had been on the run since Atlanta. Because of the incredibly fast pace of the march General Sherman left his supply trains days and even weeks behind, and thus he gave his troops leave to do virtually whatever they pleased for the duration of the march. Food and supplies were requisitioned from the civilian populace, and what couldn't be eaten or carried off was simply burned. Factories – such as they were – farms and railroads were all fair game to Sherman, as he considered them vital to the war effort, and rightly so. In fact, he went so far as to tear up almost 300 miles of railroad, had them heated in bonfires made from the railroad ties, and curled the rails around trees, making them essentially worthless. The locals called these "Sherman's Neckties," and still inspire sectional animosity to this day. (Wars and Battles, 2012) Telegraph wires, railroads, anything that could be used against his troops he had destroyed, demolished or mutilated beyond function. (Weatherby, 2011) It is also interesting to note that Hood's troops would burn stores of food as they went as well, to avoid Sherman from using them, but the Union army was moving at such a pace, that they couldn't burn them all without being overtaken.

Overall, it was a grueling venture, but the lack of restrictions made it worth it to many a Union footman, and the slaves freed under President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation swelled Sherman's ranks. But in December, after a total lightning war of sprinting across Georgia, Sherman finally made it to Savannah, the last stop before the Atlantic Ocean. Behind him, he and his army had cut a blazing swathe right through the heart of Georgia, leaving homesteads burnt, crops eaten or destroyed, and the people broken. As one Union soldier wrote, "it isn’t so sweet to secede, as [they] thought it would be." (Sherman's March, 1996) Sherman sent a communiqué to his counterpart, General Hood, demanding that the Confederate army in the city surrender; in return, Sherman promised to spare the soldiers, city and its inhabitants, and if not, he would utterly destroy them all. (Wars and Battles, 2012) Hood decided to abandon the city to Sherman, and on 21 December, Sherman marched in to Savannah and took it without firing a shot, declaring it a Christmas present to President Lincoln. They stayed in Savannah for the winter, and began their burning march again in the spring of 1865, and in spite of General Robert E. Lee replacing Hood with Johnston, Sherman's campaign into South Carolina was just as successful, leading to the surrender of Johnston's Confederate army, a few weeks after General Lee surrendered at Appomattox Courthouse.

William Tecumseh Sherman's 'March to the Sea' was brutal, ruthless, destructive and devastating, but it was extremely effective. It broke the will to fight in many Southerners, and cast doubts about the Confederacy's ability to survive in even the stoutest rebel's mind. “This Union and its Government must be sustained, at any and every cost,” explained one of Sherman’s subordinates. “To sustain it, we must war upon and destroy the organized rebel forces,--must cut off their supplies, destroy their communications…and produce among the people of Georgia a thorough conviction of the personal misery which attends war, and the utter helplessness and inability of their ‘rulers’ to protect them… If that terror and grief and even want shall help to paralyze their husbands and fathers who are fighting us… it is mercy in the end.” (Sherman's March, 1996) Sherman himself summed it up by saying "War is cruelty. You cannot refine it." No matter if you view him as a heartless, cruel war criminal as the South did, or a valorous hero willing to take the necessary steps to preserve the Union as he was viewed in the North, it is impossible to deny that the bold and extreme plan of this Ohioan helped speed along the end of the war, and prevent any more blood spilled in this one indivisible nation.

References

Ohio History Central. (2005). Ohio Historical Society. Retrieved from http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/entry.php?rec=551

Sherman's March. (1996) History.com. Retrieved from http://www.history.com/topics/shermans-march

Wars and Battles: March to the Sea. (2012, September 30). United states history. Retrieved from http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h111.html

Weatherby, Edwin. (2011, December 19). [Web log message]. Retrieved from http://pipenslippers.wordpress.com/2011/12/19/shermans-march-to-the-sea/

The Beginning of the End: The Battle of Gettysburg

"Generals can do anything. There's nothing so much like a god on earth as a General on a battlefield." -Col. Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, as played by Jeff Daniels in Gettysburg. This quote, while from a movie, is very apt for the battle of Gettysburg. The tactics – such as they were – are viewed in hindsight as sheer insanity, for the most part. Granted, they were rather hasty preparations, but still tactically unsound.

The battle at Gettysburg was entirely accidental. Rebel General Robert E. Lee had launched an offensive into Union-controlled territory after a series of successful campaigns. However, part of this planned offensive was to win over the populace and be resupplied by them. Unfortunately for Lee, the opposite occurred, where most towns were hostile to the Confederates. This left the rebels scavenging for supplies in the various towns, one of which was named Gettysburg. As some of the Confederates went into the town for supplies, especially shoes, they spied Union troops. Despite General Lee's order to avoid a general engagement until his entire army was concentrated, the rebels decided to mount a significant reconnaissance in force the following morning to determine the size and strength of the enemy force in his front.

Assuming the town to be undefended, Confederate Brigadier Generals James Archer and Joseph Davis marched to occupy the city under the command of General Henry Heth. Unbeknownst to Heth, the town was in fact defended, by Union Brigadier General John Buford's cavalry. (Williams, 2007) The Union troops were better equipped, and supported by horse-artillery, but the dismounted cavalry was outnumbered by the Confederate infantry, and after an hour of defense, were obliged to fall back to the hills outside the town. However, this gave two additional Union brigades, including the famed "Iron Brigade", to march and reinforce Buford's position on McPherson ridge. General John F. Reynolds, commander of I Corps, had an infinite amount of foresight at this point, immediately sending dispatches for nearest Union corps, the XI and III Corps, to begin moving to Gettysburg. However, Gen. Reynolds was shot and killed while positioning his troops, which thrust Gen. Abner Doubleday into the commander's position, in spite of his arrival only a short time earlier. The battle waged on, with both sides gaining reinforcements throughout the day, until about 2:30 PM, when General Lee arrived on the scene. His counterpart, General George Meade, was commanding the Union forces from approximately 9 miles away, in Taneytown, MD, but he too was making his way to the battlefield. Thus, the stage was set for one of the bloodiest battles in American history, and what many claim to be the turning point in the civil war.

One of the biggest problems with Lee's tactics for the rebels was overconfidence. After the victories they had accomplished, in spite of not winning the populace, they believed that they simply couldn't lose, due to their military prowess and the supposed righteousness of their cause. However, a bigger issue for them was a lack of intelligence. This was by no fault of Gen. Lee, but rather J.E.B. Stuart. His cavalry was supposed to gather intel on the Union army, but didn't return in a timely manner, forcing Lee to rely on a network of spies, whom he thought highly unreliable. (Anderson) Lee, after analyzing the forces he could see on the field, at first told Gen. Heth to call off the attack, but as what remained of his scout cavalry returned, advising Lee of more Confederate forces, Lee relented. Snap decisions of Lee's often won him the day, however, due to the lack of proper intel, Lee's decisions were vague at best, and this proved disastrous on the field. First, they forced the Federal army into a retreat – although the first of Meade's main army had arrived and began fortifying the hills – and Lee wanted to turn it from retreat to rout. After checking down the line, and allowing Heth's men to rest per the Heths' request, Lee planned to send another batch of men, telling his generals to take the hills "if practical". (Anderson) However, General James Longstreet arrived that evening, and advised to hold off the attack until the morning, and that proved a fatal mistake. Meade's men arrived in force over the night, fortified their hills, and were waiting for the rebels the next day. Lee continued his aggressive strategy, gambling that the only way to win was to forcefully attack. Gen. Longstreet vehemently opposed this, but led his men down the center, with the other Confederate units flanking on either side, and Lee sending his last fresh division as well: George Pickett's.

Meade, however, knew of Lee's aggressiveness, and didn't merely wait to be attacked. He ordered the troops who had retreated off Culp's Hill to go back up an retake the trenches they'd spent all night building, surprising the rebels. Needless to say, the Union troops were angry about being expelled from their foxholes, and were quite willing to get them back. In contrast to Lee, General Meade planned his tactics around his equipment and unit commanders: Sharps and Burnside single-shot carbines, Sharps rifles, and even a few Spencer repeating rifles among the cavalry. He planned for defense of the hills, and the occasional counter attack based on his unit commander's discretion, even though very few decided to counter, like Colonel Chamberlain. Unfortunately, Meade – like Lee – believed in a so-called 'gentleman's war', where the two sides would march in column files, firing at each other without cover and unleashing untold amounts of carnage. These tactics remained relative unchanged for years, until Generals Sherman and Grant thought to break away from the Old World's way of waging war. The cavalry at Gettysburg engaged in a classically stereotypical charge, but both sides had their cavalrymen fight dismounted for the better part of the war. ("Celebrate Gettysburg Magazine," 2011)

In short, this was Lee's greatest mistake of the Civil War. It led to his own undoing, and ultimately, the Confederacy's downfall. (Andrade, 2003) From his choice to attack without adequate intelligence or support from Stuart's cavalry, to his foolhardy advance known as Pickett's Charge, Lee's military brilliance was undermined by his aggressiveness. Meade, while not the military genius Lee was, was methodical and cautious, and in this rare situation, it paid off. His lack of aggressiveness, tempered with a willingness to counter, is what won him the day, and the battle, and eventually, the war. It also showed commanders on both sides that the traditional, age-old style of battles – the so-called 'gentleman's war' – was a thing of the past, and tactics needed to change with the weaponry and times, and lead us into the battlefields of today.

References

Andrade, Phil. (2003). Mistake of All Mistakes. Retrieved from http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/gettysburg/articles/mistakeofallmistakes.aspx

Anderson, Jack. (n.d.). Lee At Gettysburg: A Critical Analysis of Aggressive Tactics. Retrieved from http://wcoventry0.tripod.com/id23.htm

Celebrate Gettysburg Magazine. (2011, October 11). Retrieved from http://www.celebrategettysburg.com/civil-war-journal-5.html

Williams, Bryan. (2007, November 02). The Battle of Gettysburg. Retrieved from http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/gettysburg/getty11.aspx

Popular Destiny: Causes and Views Leading to the Civil War

Manifest destiny and popular sovereignty are not common phrases evoked in modern culture. What exactly are these two theories, popularized so long ago? What roles did they play in changes to the culture and society of the day? Were they really as divisive as is frequently asserted? These questions and more will be explored in the contents of this paper, examining the root causes of the United States' Civil War.

First up, "manifest destiny". Manifest Destiny is the theory propagated by the religious fervor in the late 1700's, primarily from New England's Puritans. The victories of the War of 1812 fueled this religious nationalism, as did the Louisiana Purchase, and Lewis & Clark's exploration of the territory. However, it wasn't until newspaper columnist and editor John O'Sullivan's article regarding the annexation of Texas published in The United States Magazine and Democratic Review was the term 'Manifest Destiny' actually coined. (ushistory.org, 2008) As vast droves of people moved west, first with the promise of free land, and then with the Californian gold rush, they brought the economics of their home states along with them, leading to Southerners looking for land to produce cotton, tobacco and other crops to clash with the industrialized Northerners looking for factory lands and resources to tap into. These issues were temporarily resolved with some measures like the Mason-Dixon Line, but Manifest Destiny raised questions about this fledgling nation's views on religion, regional economics – and their relation to each other on a federal level, race and the value of man, national patriotism, and even morality, to an extent. 

Popular sovereignty, on the other hand, was the name given the theory that the people living in a given area should decide their own nature of government. The first man to really propagate the theory was Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan, however, it didn't gain national prominence until Stephen A. Douglas coined the term in 1854. There were two main factions of the popular sovereignty movement: one that asserted that the territory's settlers should vote on their status early in territorial development. The other stance said a territory's status should be determined by a vote, taken when the territory was ready for statehood. ("United states history," 2009) This theory was the basis for the Compromise of 1850, and then the Kansas-Nebraska Act four years later. However, due to the "Bleeding Kansas' tragedy, the gaping holes in this ideology became sharply evident. After these events, it was mocking called "squatter sovereignty" by John C. Calhoun, and consequently picked up by the theories critics, primarily Southerners and pro-slavery Northerners. It was hoped that the application of popular sovereignty to incoming states and would preserve the Union. Unfortunately, it was not to be, as it would only work if there were enough voters in the territory persuaded to lean pro-slavery, and apart from an ACORN-level of voter fraud, was nigh impossible to achieve. The death knell for popular sovereignty came in the 1858 Lincoln-Douglas senatorial debates, when Stephen A. Douglas admitted that he believed that local laws could nullify the current federal fugitive-slave laws. That is when most historians see the theory as losing most of its Southern backing, and talks of secession began in earnest. (Weatherby, 2011)

These two views both had their own respective heydays. Manifest destiny inspired a nation to grow to its maximum physical potential, and even made a resurgence with the admission of Alaska and Hawaii. It united a people and gave them a purpose: to be fruitful and multiply across the land, and spread American influence from sea to shining sea. On the other hand, popular sovereignty, a theory born, raised and propagated from the south, tried to appease both sides of the slavery debate. However, all it truly succeeded in doing was driving the two sides further apart, even to the point of bloodshed. Effective for a time, it was at most a temporary measure, not really resolving anything for our nation. By the time it was given up, our newly-expanded country was not only divided ideologically, but was on the brink of war, needing only the slightest catalyst to push it over the edge into a bloody oblivion.

References

ushistory.org. (2008, April 12). U.S. history online textbook. Retrieved from http://www.ushistory.org/us/29.asp

United states history. (2009, May 14). Retrieved from http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h228.html

Weatherby, E. (2011, December 19). [Web log message]. Retrieved from http://pipenslippers.wordpress.com/2011/12/19/civil-war-sectionalism/