Utilitarianism: A Union of Hedonism and Christianity

Utilitarianism is considered by many to be one of the most persuasive and influential theories ever presented in philosophical circles. Even though it wasn't completely expressed in its modern sense until the 19^th century, unlabeled utilitarianism has been seen all throughout history. Because of this, there's no real set, uniform type of utilitarianism, but most people who claim to be utilitarianist hold the view that the morally right action is the action that produces the most good. Some would claim this is merely a subset of consequentialism, since in essence, what is considered the right action is based entirely on the consequences produced. Others claim it's a branch of egoism, but utilitarianism has a grander scope of the consequences considered: utilitarianists seek to maximize the overall good, considering the good of others as well as one's own good. Both Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, the classical utilitarianists, agreed with Epicurus' hedonistic view of value, that the worth of something is measured by how much good is brought about for the greatest number. (Burns, 2005) This works for the utilitarianist, because the theory is impartial and gender-neutral, meaning that everyone's happiness is equal, whether you're a homeless man, a single mom, a sports star or the president.

The origins of utilitarianism are a bit disputed, even though Jeremy Bentham was the first to really pin down and develop actual "utilitarianism", because the concept of the greatest good for the greatest number had been around for ages before. The distinctive part about Bentham's utilitarianism is the premise that morally proper actions and behaviors will not bring harm to others, but rather increase the happiness and utility of the people involved. It is interesting to note that many of the earliest utilitarians were in fact theologians. Richard Cumberland, John Gay and others believed that it was our duty to promote human happiness, since it was God's will that we be happy. Gay specifically held that wants what's best for us, He wants us to be happy, and since God gave us a measure of virtue, the happiness of mankind is that measure, but "once removed." (Driver, 2009) Combined with the view of human motivation and even some egotistic elements, Gay concluded that a person's salvation and eternal happiness depended solely on compliance with the will of God, as did virtue itself. So as one promoted the happiness of mankind, it overlapped with the happiness of one's self, and it wasn't merely an accident, but divine providence. This view, while acceptable at the time, isn't a very clean theory, because it isn't clear or scientifically measurable what work God does, at least in regards of normative ethics.

Gay's theory, however, has considerable influence on later utilitarianistic writers. William Paley took Gay's theories on utilitarianism and continued to develop them, but men like David Hume rejected the theological views in favor more naturalistic approach, relying primarily on human nature's sympathetic interaction with others. Hume's absence of God as a theoretical necessity undermined both Paley's and Gay's work, but all three were considered to be highly influential to utilitarianism in general. There were other notable utilitarians during that time period, specifically Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson, and these men, along with the aforementioned three, make what some call the "British Moralists", and were all key influences on classic utilitarianism. (Driver, 2009)

Utilitarianism in and of itself is an interesting theory. It's views on the collective good are loved and hated at the same time, being both wonderful and horrid. Jeremy Bentham thought that if man could be taught to care for the collective, everyone would be better off. If humans could unconditionally love one another without reserve, and put the good of the group before their own – while it still included their own good, for the most part – then a utopian society would result, because the happiness of the community as a whole is nothing other than the addition of all the individual humans' interests. (Kemerling, 2011)

This very premise posed a problem, though. It didn't factor for the inevitable evil that is so pervasive in human beings, known amongst Christian circles as the "sin nature". In fact, Dr. Leonard Peikoff states in his book The Ominous Parallels,

"Utilitarianism is a union of hedonism and Christianity. The first teaches man to love pleasure; the second, to love his neighbor. The union consists in teaching man to love his neighbor’s pleasure. To be exact, the Utilitarians teach that an action is moral if its result is to maximize pleasure among men in general."

So according to utilitarianists, man should serve, but not serve a specific nation or even economic class, but merely for the so-called "greatest good," regardless of who it may or may not harm. Dr. Peikoff goes on to point out that Mill, one of the aforementioned fathers of the utilitarian theory, says that men must be "disinterested" and "strictly impartial" about their own happiness and well-being, in spite of what is natural inclinations may be. (Peikoff, 1983) Because of this blind following for the collective, the theory can easily be hijacked for the malevolent use of a select few, using propaganda and philosophy. This can be seen in the writings of Karl Marx; Lenin's October Revolution, where workers banded together claiming the good of many at the expense of the few; the Nazi regime of Hitler, with Dr. Josef Goebbels telling his countrymen that they needed to put the good of the Fatherland before their own, regardless of consequence; and then perfected again in Russia, under the leadership of Josef Stalin, and ultimately leading to the deaths of millions of Soviet citizens. In a disturbing twist, Dr. Peikoff also finds these very principles being taught with prevalence in the American school system, from colleges, all the way to grade school.

It's hard to say if Bentham, Mill, Hume, and the other fathers of Utilitarianism would be proud of what their theory had accomplished, if they would overlook the atrocities it is linked to of the 20^th century, if they would have any regrets, or attempt to alter their theory. But for a theory designed to bring the greatest pleasure to the greatest number of people, it has brought a great deal of pain into the world. A theory much like Communism, socialism or fascism, utilitarianism is a wonderful idea – on paper. But unfortunately, when applied in a practical sense, is nothing more than that: a tried, and failed, idea.

References

Burns, J. H. (2005). Happiness and Utility:Jeremy Bentham’s Equation. Retrieved from http://www.utilitarianism.com/jeremy-bentham/greatest-happiness.pdf

Driver, J. (2009). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/

Kemerling, G. K. (2011, November 12). www.philosophypages.com. Retrieved from http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/5q.htm

Peikoff, L. (1983). The Ominous Parallels: the End of Freedom in America. New York City: Plume.

Smashing Peaches: Sherman's March to the Sea

William Tecumseh Sherman, born 8 February 1820, has been called the United States' first "modern general". He served under General Ulysses S. Grant in the west, most notably during the fall of Vicksburg, but when Grant was promoted by President Abraham Lincoln, Sherman took over his boss' old position in the west. In this position, Sherman engaged in total war, driving all the way to the Atlantic, burning as he went. He received some criticism for this brutal form of warfare, but he deemed it necessary to break the will of the South.

Sherman's march to the sea began with his belief in the "total war" concept – a concept frowned upon by most military leaders, both at the time and today. His reasoning behind this was that the Union army was not merely "fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war." (Ohio History Central, 2005) He intended to break the will of the rebel population, and thus, the will of the Confederate army, by any means necessary. Sherman proposed this plan after his and Grant's victory at Atlanta – an important railroad hub for the Confederacy, along with being one of their main industrial centers – and after the Union's supply lines were attacked in guerrilla warfare-style tactics by the rebels. "I can make this march, and make Georgia howl!" he vowed in a telegram to his superiors. Instead of sending his army on a wild goose chase after a phantasmal army, General Sherman received approval to split his army, sending 60,000 under the command of Major General George Thomas chasing the Confederate guerrillas to Tennessee, and taking the remaining 62,000 men through Georgia, going along, as he wrote, "smashing things to the sea." (Sherman's March, 1996)

This 'smashing' march was almost a blitzkrieg in its effectiveness, with many Confederate towns being attacked with little or no warning. (Weatherby, 2011) He sacked towns, burned plantations, and captured livestock and supplies, virtually unopposed by the army of General John Bell Hood, who had been on the run since Atlanta. Because of the incredibly fast pace of the march General Sherman left his supply trains days and even weeks behind, and thus he gave his troops leave to do virtually whatever they pleased for the duration of the march. Food and supplies were requisitioned from the civilian populace, and what couldn't be eaten or carried off was simply burned. Factories – such as they were – farms and railroads were all fair game to Sherman, as he considered them vital to the war effort, and rightly so. In fact, he went so far as to tear up almost 300 miles of railroad, had them heated in bonfires made from the railroad ties, and curled the rails around trees, making them essentially worthless. The locals called these "Sherman's Neckties," and still inspire sectional animosity to this day. (Wars and Battles, 2012) Telegraph wires, railroads, anything that could be used against his troops he had destroyed, demolished or mutilated beyond function. (Weatherby, 2011) It is also interesting to note that Hood's troops would burn stores of food as they went as well, to avoid Sherman from using them, but the Union army was moving at such a pace, that they couldn't burn them all without being overtaken.

Overall, it was a grueling venture, but the lack of restrictions made it worth it to many a Union footman, and the slaves freed under President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation swelled Sherman's ranks. But in December, after a total lightning war of sprinting across Georgia, Sherman finally made it to Savannah, the last stop before the Atlantic Ocean. Behind him, he and his army had cut a blazing swathe right through the heart of Georgia, leaving homesteads burnt, crops eaten or destroyed, and the people broken. As one Union soldier wrote, "it isn’t so sweet to secede, as [they] thought it would be." (Sherman's March, 1996) Sherman sent a communiqué to his counterpart, General Hood, demanding that the Confederate army in the city surrender; in return, Sherman promised to spare the soldiers, city and its inhabitants, and if not, he would utterly destroy them all. (Wars and Battles, 2012) Hood decided to abandon the city to Sherman, and on 21 December, Sherman marched in to Savannah and took it without firing a shot, declaring it a Christmas present to President Lincoln. They stayed in Savannah for the winter, and began their burning march again in the spring of 1865, and in spite of General Robert E. Lee replacing Hood with Johnston, Sherman's campaign into South Carolina was just as successful, leading to the surrender of Johnston's Confederate army, a few weeks after General Lee surrendered at Appomattox Courthouse.

William Tecumseh Sherman's 'March to the Sea' was brutal, ruthless, destructive and devastating, but it was extremely effective. It broke the will to fight in many Southerners, and cast doubts about the Confederacy's ability to survive in even the stoutest rebel's mind. “This Union and its Government must be sustained, at any and every cost,” explained one of Sherman’s subordinates. “To sustain it, we must war upon and destroy the organized rebel forces,--must cut off their supplies, destroy their communications…and produce among the people of Georgia a thorough conviction of the personal misery which attends war, and the utter helplessness and inability of their ‘rulers’ to protect them… If that terror and grief and even want shall help to paralyze their husbands and fathers who are fighting us… it is mercy in the end.” (Sherman's March, 1996) Sherman himself summed it up by saying "War is cruelty. You cannot refine it." No matter if you view him as a heartless, cruel war criminal as the South did, or a valorous hero willing to take the necessary steps to preserve the Union as he was viewed in the North, it is impossible to deny that the bold and extreme plan of this Ohioan helped speed along the end of the war, and prevent any more blood spilled in this one indivisible nation.

References

Ohio History Central. (2005). Ohio Historical Society. Retrieved from http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/entry.php?rec=551

Sherman's March. (1996) History.com. Retrieved from http://www.history.com/topics/shermans-march

Wars and Battles: March to the Sea. (2012, September 30). United states history. Retrieved from http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h111.html

Weatherby, Edwin. (2011, December 19). [Web log message]. Retrieved from http://pipenslippers.wordpress.com/2011/12/19/shermans-march-to-the-sea/

The Beginning of the End: The Battle of Gettysburg

"Generals can do anything. There's nothing so much like a god on earth as a General on a battlefield." -Col. Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, as played by Jeff Daniels in Gettysburg. This quote, while from a movie, is very apt for the battle of Gettysburg. The tactics – such as they were – are viewed in hindsight as sheer insanity, for the most part. Granted, they were rather hasty preparations, but still tactically unsound.

The battle at Gettysburg was entirely accidental. Rebel General Robert E. Lee had launched an offensive into Union-controlled territory after a series of successful campaigns. However, part of this planned offensive was to win over the populace and be resupplied by them. Unfortunately for Lee, the opposite occurred, where most towns were hostile to the Confederates. This left the rebels scavenging for supplies in the various towns, one of which was named Gettysburg. As some of the Confederates went into the town for supplies, especially shoes, they spied Union troops. Despite General Lee's order to avoid a general engagement until his entire army was concentrated, the rebels decided to mount a significant reconnaissance in force the following morning to determine the size and strength of the enemy force in his front.

Assuming the town to be undefended, Confederate Brigadier Generals James Archer and Joseph Davis marched to occupy the city under the command of General Henry Heth. Unbeknownst to Heth, the town was in fact defended, by Union Brigadier General John Buford's cavalry. (Williams, 2007) The Union troops were better equipped, and supported by horse-artillery, but the dismounted cavalry was outnumbered by the Confederate infantry, and after an hour of defense, were obliged to fall back to the hills outside the town. However, this gave two additional Union brigades, including the famed "Iron Brigade", to march and reinforce Buford's position on McPherson ridge. General John F. Reynolds, commander of I Corps, had an infinite amount of foresight at this point, immediately sending dispatches for nearest Union corps, the XI and III Corps, to begin moving to Gettysburg. However, Gen. Reynolds was shot and killed while positioning his troops, which thrust Gen. Abner Doubleday into the commander's position, in spite of his arrival only a short time earlier. The battle waged on, with both sides gaining reinforcements throughout the day, until about 2:30 PM, when General Lee arrived on the scene. His counterpart, General George Meade, was commanding the Union forces from approximately 9 miles away, in Taneytown, MD, but he too was making his way to the battlefield. Thus, the stage was set for one of the bloodiest battles in American history, and what many claim to be the turning point in the civil war.

One of the biggest problems with Lee's tactics for the rebels was overconfidence. After the victories they had accomplished, in spite of not winning the populace, they believed that they simply couldn't lose, due to their military prowess and the supposed righteousness of their cause. However, a bigger issue for them was a lack of intelligence. This was by no fault of Gen. Lee, but rather J.E.B. Stuart. His cavalry was supposed to gather intel on the Union army, but didn't return in a timely manner, forcing Lee to rely on a network of spies, whom he thought highly unreliable. (Anderson) Lee, after analyzing the forces he could see on the field, at first told Gen. Heth to call off the attack, but as what remained of his scout cavalry returned, advising Lee of more Confederate forces, Lee relented. Snap decisions of Lee's often won him the day, however, due to the lack of proper intel, Lee's decisions were vague at best, and this proved disastrous on the field. First, they forced the Federal army into a retreat – although the first of Meade's main army had arrived and began fortifying the hills – and Lee wanted to turn it from retreat to rout. After checking down the line, and allowing Heth's men to rest per the Heths' request, Lee planned to send another batch of men, telling his generals to take the hills "if practical". (Anderson) However, General James Longstreet arrived that evening, and advised to hold off the attack until the morning, and that proved a fatal mistake. Meade's men arrived in force over the night, fortified their hills, and were waiting for the rebels the next day. Lee continued his aggressive strategy, gambling that the only way to win was to forcefully attack. Gen. Longstreet vehemently opposed this, but led his men down the center, with the other Confederate units flanking on either side, and Lee sending his last fresh division as well: George Pickett's.

Meade, however, knew of Lee's aggressiveness, and didn't merely wait to be attacked. He ordered the troops who had retreated off Culp's Hill to go back up an retake the trenches they'd spent all night building, surprising the rebels. Needless to say, the Union troops were angry about being expelled from their foxholes, and were quite willing to get them back. In contrast to Lee, General Meade planned his tactics around his equipment and unit commanders: Sharps and Burnside single-shot carbines, Sharps rifles, and even a few Spencer repeating rifles among the cavalry. He planned for defense of the hills, and the occasional counter attack based on his unit commander's discretion, even though very few decided to counter, like Colonel Chamberlain. Unfortunately, Meade – like Lee – believed in a so-called 'gentleman's war', where the two sides would march in column files, firing at each other without cover and unleashing untold amounts of carnage. These tactics remained relative unchanged for years, until Generals Sherman and Grant thought to break away from the Old World's way of waging war. The cavalry at Gettysburg engaged in a classically stereotypical charge, but both sides had their cavalrymen fight dismounted for the better part of the war. ("Celebrate Gettysburg Magazine," 2011)

In short, this was Lee's greatest mistake of the Civil War. It led to his own undoing, and ultimately, the Confederacy's downfall. (Andrade, 2003) From his choice to attack without adequate intelligence or support from Stuart's cavalry, to his foolhardy advance known as Pickett's Charge, Lee's military brilliance was undermined by his aggressiveness. Meade, while not the military genius Lee was, was methodical and cautious, and in this rare situation, it paid off. His lack of aggressiveness, tempered with a willingness to counter, is what won him the day, and the battle, and eventually, the war. It also showed commanders on both sides that the traditional, age-old style of battles – the so-called 'gentleman's war' – was a thing of the past, and tactics needed to change with the weaponry and times, and lead us into the battlefields of today.

References

Andrade, Phil. (2003). Mistake of All Mistakes. Retrieved from http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/gettysburg/articles/mistakeofallmistakes.aspx

Anderson, Jack. (n.d.). Lee At Gettysburg: A Critical Analysis of Aggressive Tactics. Retrieved from http://wcoventry0.tripod.com/id23.htm

Celebrate Gettysburg Magazine. (2011, October 11). Retrieved from http://www.celebrategettysburg.com/civil-war-journal-5.html

Williams, Bryan. (2007, November 02). The Battle of Gettysburg. Retrieved from http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/gettysburg/getty11.aspx